Sample Five
NELSON’S TACTICS AT THE BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR
The prevailing orthodoxy prior to 1805 involved manoeuvring to approach the enemy flotilla in a single line of battle before an engagement that took place in parallel lines. Before this, fleets merely engaged in a melée whereupon the opposing fleets became mixed together. One of the reasons for the development of the line of battle was to help the admiral signal effectively to his Fleet. Moreover, the line also allowed either side to disengage by breaking away in formation. If the attacker chose to continue combat their line would be broken as well. This latter tactic generally led to inconclusive battles or allowed the losing side to reduce its losses. At Trafalgar, Nelson wished to see a conclusive battle.
Nelson’s battle plan was to cut the Franco-Spanish line in two. Approaching in twin columns sailing directly at the enemy, one near the centre of the opposing line and one near the trailing end, his ships would break the enemy formation in half, surround that half, and force them to fight to the end. Nelson specifically hoped to cut the line just in front of the flagship: the isolated ships in front of the break would not be able to see the flagship's signals, hopefully taking them out of combat while they reformed.
The plan had three principal advantages. Firstly, it would allow the British fleet to close with the French-Spanish fleet as quickly as possible, reducing the chance that it would be able to escape without fighting. Secondly, it would quickly bring on a mêlée and frantic battle by breaking the French-Spanish line and inducing a series of individual ship-to-ship fights, in which the British were likely to prevail. Nelson knew that the better seamanship, faster gunnery, and higher morale of his crews had decisive advantages that could not be compensated for by any amount of bravery on the part of their opponents. Thirdly, it would bring a decisive concentration on the rear of the French-Spanish fleet. The ships in the van of the enemy fleet would have to turn back to support the rear, an effort which would take a long time.
The main drawback of attacking head on was that the Franco-Spanish ships would be able to maintain a raking broadside fire on the bows of the leading British ships as they approached, to which the British ships would be unable to reply. Nelson, however, was well aware that French and Spanish gunners were ill-trained, would in all probability be supplemented with soldiers, and would have difficulty firing accurately from a moving gun platform. After all, the Combined Fleet was sailing across a heavy swell, which caused the ships to roll heavily and exacerbated the problem. Nelson's plan was indeed a gamble, but a carefully calculated one.
Nelson was careful to point out that something had to be left to chance. Nothing is sure in a sea fight beyond all others, and he left his captains free from all hampering rules by telling them that "No captain can do very wrong if he places his ship alongside that of the enemy." In short, the execution was to be as circumstances dictated, subject to the guiding rule that the enemy's rear was to be cut off and superior force concentrated on that part of the enemy's line.
Of course, the rest is well charted history. Nelson secured a resounding victory and, it has been argued, effectively ended any chance of success for Napoleon’s campaign in Europe.
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